Dans la foulée des attaques du 11 septembre 2001, des chercheurs ont observé que les activités de surveillance biaisées et les mesures discriminatoires d"application de la loi se sont intensifiées. En 2003, Reem Bahdi a publié "No Exit: Racial
Racial profiling acts as our mirror-it reflects an increasingly racialized society that...tries desperately to avoid seeing itself through the gaze of its excluded others. 
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, Reem Bahdi encouraged policy and decision makers to respond more forcefully to racial profiling, which she argued received tacit acceptance in Canada after 9/11. 4 What was generally regarded as a human rights violation became, after 9/11, a discussion about whether profiling was -morally, legally, or politically‖ justifiable as a tool in the War against Terrorism. 5 Bahdi argued that policy-makers and the public were often blind to the significant injuries that occur from profiling. Profiling was commonly rationalized as a way to avoid further terrorist attacks. As Pue pointed out, supporters of Canada's anti-terrorism law maintained that -overweening police powers are acceptable because they are lesser than the evil of prohibit or criminalize any political, religious, ideological thought, belief or opinion.‖ 16 The Court concluded that -it is the nature of the activity and the nature of the state response that may generate the ‗chilling effect', not the content of the legislation.‖ 17 The Ontario Court of Appeal also confirmed Khawaja's convictions and increased his sentence to life in prison. 18 Leave to appeal was granted and the Supreme Court of Canada issued its judgment on December 14, 2012 upholding the constitutionality of the motive clause as well as the convictions and the sentence. 19 In this comment, I take the position that both appellate courts ignore findings by socio-legal scholars, as well as the Ontario Superior Court, that discriminatory attitudes influence the investigatory process resulting in unfair consequences for racialized communities. 20 The higher courts' emphasis on the formal language of the motive clause rather than the policing response overlooks the power of legal terminology to give license to intolerance by shoring up biased social, environmental and political factors. 21 I argue that requiring a strict legal test to determine harm places an unreasonable burden on members of affected communities whose lived experience is not considered by the higher courts as relevant to social context or as reliable evidence to establish a problem in regard to policing discretion. 22 As a result, the Court of Appeal's decision, largely affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, signals a retreat from the Charter"s spirit and central tenets in relation to equality and religious freedom, broadly defined. 23 Prior academic analysis of the motive clause has primarily focused on assessing the Criminal Code amendments 24 or, to a lesser extent, evaluating the Khawaja Superior Court decision. 25 Through a synthesis of social science and legal methods, I address the limited academic scrutiny of the appeal decisions, including . I raise cautions on the appellate conclusions by critically interrogating what might otherwise be taken as neutral judicial findings. I pinpoint ways and (2012) confirm the doubts raised prior to the case law that the motive clause reinforced stereotyping. Certain of my findings relate 16 Khawaja (2010), supra note 1, at para 76. 17 Ibid at para 130. 18 Ibid at paras 253-255. The author acknowledges the anonymous peer reviewer whose comments were helpful in crystalizing this insight. specifically to the Ontario appellate judgment given its more extensive commentary on the motive clause. I end the analysis by interrogating the Court of Appeal's call for quantitative or -hard‖ evidence that directly establishes the -chilling effect‖ as a by-product of the motive clause. This approach, affirmed by the Supreme Court, gives limited credence to academic findings and personal accounts that urge greater sensitivity to the social environmental factors that give rise to profiling.
26 I conclude by restating the call by Bahdi for anti-terrrorist responses that promote equality by generating social inclusion.
II. SETTING THE CONTEXT
Khawaja's trial was one of the most newsworthy and legally significant prosecutions under the Criminal Code amendments of 2001. The anti-terrorism statute revived and expanded upon the debates on racial profiling as a law enforcement practice that existed before 9/11. In the post 9/11 environment, the focus shifted to incorporate Arabs and Muslims as the bodies that mandated surveillance along with Black and Aboriginal Canadians.
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A. Concerns about Racial Profiling in the Post 9/11 Environment
To Bahdi, the belief that profiling was less problematic than terrorist attacks became widely held after 9/11 due to misplaced confidence in profiling as a preventative strategy. 28 Bahdi defined profiling as the identification of a segment of the population for -special scrutiny‖ to curb violence, crime, and other negative behaviour based on the criteria of suspicion and risk. 29 Research participants in Bajit Nagra's qualitative study were also aware that expressions of religious devotion could be interpreted as markers of terroristrelated affiliations and aspirations. After the 9/11 attacks, one research participant was encouraged by family members to shave his beard to avoid negative attention. 43 Another was harassed on a bus for wearing a headscarf. 44 Yet another stated racial discrimination was more common prior to 9/11, whereas after 9/11, the bias appeared to form around religious factors.
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B. Background to the Motive Clause
One of the most controversial aspects of the 2001 anti-terrorism law was the incorporation of -motive‖ into the definition of terrorism. Numerous commentators raised concerns about the impact of the clause on policing activities. Wes Pue and Robert Russo argued that the Criminal Code definition of terrorism was viewed by many experts -as dangerously vague and overly broad, inviting racial and religious screening by state authorities.‖
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For Kent Roach, incorporating motive in the criminal law meant the politics and religion of defendants would become an important focus in criminal trials, allowing biased attitudes to influence judicial decision-making. 47 In contrast, David Jenkins rejected these findings, stating:
While inclusion of motivational elements is out of the ordinary, it is necessary to address terrorism as a peculiar criminal phenomenon undermining the normative foundations of liberal democracy.
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Ibid at 20. 43 Baljit Nagra, -‗Our Faith Was Also Hijacked by Those People': Reclaiming Muslim Identity in Canada in a Post-9/11 Era‖ (2011) 37 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 425, quoting Salman at 436 who said this happened shortly after 9/11. 44 Ibid. Amineh, a 23-year-old who wears the hijab and is readily identifiable as Muslim, conveyed this story at 431:
After 9/11 in Canada, I stopped taking public transport because I started getting harassed a lot. I had these girls -teenage girls-blow condoms and, like, start hitting me with them and since that day I just stopped taking public transport so, yeah. Conversely, counsel for the Attorney General of Canada successfully argued for the clause's retention. 53 The Attorney General of Canada contended that the accused failed to produce evidence of a problem.
54
Furthermore, the defence downplayed terrorists' acts as the most important reason for public anxiety.
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C. Linking Facially Neutral Provisions to Racial Profiling
Bahdi identifies facially neutral provisions that may silently promote racialized divisions as troubling features of anti-terrorism and profiling-related statutes.
56 In Bahdi's view, these provisions have a particularly negative impact on Muslim and Ibid at para 70:
The arguments are all without merit. The types of harmful conduct set out in the definition of terrorist activity are methods of expression that are not protected under s. 2(b). Furthermore, the Appellants' theory of a ‗chilling effect' is without any evidentiary foundation. Even if there is a ‗chilling effect', the ‗chill', at best, arises from a concern as to how the police might inappropriately implement the legislation, rather than the legislation itself. 55 Ibid.
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Bahdi, supra note 3.
Arab individuals and communities even though they are not specifically mentioned. 57 To Bahdi, seemingly unbiased laws may be applied in discriminatory ways when interpreted in accordance with often unconscious stereotypes fuelled by popular culture and the media. While she does not list the motive clause to illustrate her point, it is the type of law that concerned her. The vilification of Arabs and Muslims may justify racially motivated policing practices to regulate an aberrant community. Racially-focused policing also has implications for the administration of justice more generally. As Bahdi stated:
When decision makers operate against a backdrop of ingrained, but often unconscious stereotypes, they are likely to filter and interpret facts or events through the lens of stereotypes rather than by making an individual and rational assessment based on the facts of a given case. 58 Bahdi found the portrayal of Arabs and Muslims as fanatical and violence-prone was standard in the North American popular presses, even prior to 9/11. 59 After 9/11, scathing depictions became more commonplace, according to her research. It seems to me that the inevitable impact to flow from the inclusion of the ‗political, religious or ideological purpose' requirement in the definition of ‗terrorist activity' will be to focus investigative and prosecutorial scrutiny on the political, religious and ideological beliefs, opinions and expressions of persons and groups both in Canada and abroad. Equally inevitable will be the chilling effect [Maureen ]Webb predicts. 70 Due to the commonly held view that global terrorist acts are often motivated by Muslim fundamentalism, Rutherford J. accepted the submission that Muslims would be subject to intensified scrutiny from the public and law enforcement officials. He held that the motive clause amounted to a prima facie infringement of the -freedoms of conscience, religion, thought, belief, expression and association‖ guaranteed under s. 2 of the Charter. 71 At paragraph 80, Rutherford J stated that he saw -no compelling benefit or justification for the political, religious or ideological ‗motive' provision in clause 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A)‖ that outweighed -its freedoms-infringing impact.‖ 72 Due to its disproportionate effect on guaranteed freedoms, Rutherford J. held that the provision was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, and was therefore -constitutionally invalid.‖ 73 
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Charter supra note 12.
67 Khawaja (2006) , supra note 11. 68 Ibid at para 58. Khawaja (2006), supra note 11 at para 58. 71 Ibid at para 58. 72 Ibid at para 80. 73 
Ibid.
The Ontario Court of Appeal, however, reversed Rutherford's conclusion. The court concluded that the -germane‖ issue was the -undoubted power‖ of the federal Parliament to incorporate -motive‖ as a component of a crime. 74 The Supreme Court similarly pronounced that the motive clause was constitutionally valid even though some other jurisdictions had not adopted similar clauses.
75 In a conclusion approved by the Supreme Court, the lower appellate court found that the guarantees of freedom of expression under s. 2(b) were inapplicable to the motive clause due to the violent nature of terrorist activity. 76 The Supreme Court acknowledged, however, that a subsequent case considering s. 83.01(1)(b)(ii)(E) might capture activity that fell -within the protected zone of free expression.‖ 77 If this occurred, the infringement on free expression would be determined under s. 1 of the Charter.
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The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the failed s. 2(b) claim nullified other claims for fundamental freedoms under s. 2 of the Charter. Even so, both courts expanded on their reasoning for holding that the rights to freedom of conscience and religion guaranteed by s. 2(a) were not violated by the motive clause. In a finding affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Ontario appeal court held that the -chill‖ identified by the Superior Court was due to the criminal behaviour of terrorists rather than the legislation prohibiting their activities. Joining with the Ontario appellate court, the Supreme Court concluded that -the chill in the expression of religious and ideological views referred to by the trial judge flowed from the post-‗9/11' climate of suspicion, not from the motive clause in the terrorism legislation.‖ 79 According to the Supreme Court, -a causal connection‖ between the motive clause and the chilling of expression of religious or ideological views was not demonstrated by Mr. Khawaja.
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The Superior Court's concern that improper law enforcement practices could flow from the motive clause was dismissed by both appeal courts. The higher courts agreed that declaring a law unconstitutional because law enforcement officials might overstep their bounds was not warranted. Ibid.
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Ibid at para 81.
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Khawaja (2010), supra note 1 at para 134, cited in Khawaja (2012), supra note 2 at para 83.
Khawaja's position that the motive clause -would legitimize law enforcement action aimed at scrutinizing individuals based on their religious, political or ideological beliefs.‖
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While Rutherford J's decision to sever the motive clause was incorrect, the Ontario appellate court deemed this error -of no moment‖ because the necessary motivations were established through the Crown's evidence presented at trial.
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The Supreme Court of Canada reconsidered this issue at Khawaja's request. The highest court rejected Khawaja's argument that the deletion of the motive clause by the Superior Court and its subsequent reinsertion by the Ontario appellate court made the trial and convictions unfair. 84 The Supreme Court affirmed the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision to uphold the convictions under the curative proviso of the Criminal Code, s. 686(1)(b)(iii), based on the trial judge's finding that motive was established through the trial evidence.
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IV. THE MOTIVE CLAUSE DISCUSSIONS IN R V KHAWAJA (2010) AND R V KHAWAJA (2012)
In this section, I argue that the Ontario Court of Appeal employed a formalistic and abstract analysis of government power and law enforcement, one which paid undue deference to state authority over matters of public safety. The Ontario appellate court's apparent willingness to defer to the state when -national security‖ is invoked minimizes human rights and equality oriented concerns; this is part of the -chill‖ analyzed throughout this paper. These worrisome tendencies were not remedied by the 2012 Supreme Court of Canada decision. While both appeal decisions briefly denounce targeted discrimination, the responses are insufficient and fail to appreciate the lived experience of discrimination disclosed in the social science research. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada stated in general terms that belie the challenges experienced by racialized subjects at the ground level:
Criminal liability should not be based on a person's political, religious or ideological views. Police should not target people as potential suspects solely because they hold or express particular views. Nor should the justice system employ improper stereotyping as a tool in legislation, investigation or prosecution.
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This pronouncement downplays the motive clause's potential to stimulate discriminatory outcomes through enforcement. In contrast to the appeal courts, the Ontario Superior Court found that the motive clause authorized wide enforcement discretion that could be exercised to the disadvantage of marginalized communities struggling to assert their rights in a fragmented and divisive political environment. Islamic followers could be exposed to unwarranted state surveillance 82 Khawaja (2012), supra note 2 at para 76. 83 Khawaja (2010), supra note 1 at para 137. 84 Khawaja (2012), supra note 2 at para 92. 85 Ibid at para 94. 86 Ibid at para 83.
under the authority of the motive clause if their expressions of religious devotion were equated to violent extremism. Chon and Arzt's exploration of the human rights concerns of Muslim Americans in the post 9/11 context is helpful in deconstructing the appellate courts' findings. They assert that more complex understandings are needed in regard to the intersections between law and what they label -terror-profiling‖, which they define as -the selectively negative treatment -both by government and private entities of individuals or groupsthought to be associated with terrorist activity, based on race, ethnicity, national origin and/or religion.‖ 87 For Chon and Arzt, Muslim status is more than -an incidental correlation to more acceptable governmental classifications‖, as it appeared to have been cast by the appellate court in 88 and by the Supreme Court in Khawaja (2012). 89 Chon and Artz argue that being Muslim in the racially charged climate that emerged in the early 2000s is more appropriately viewed as -a discriminatory proxy for racial difference.‖ 90 The Superior Court decision more effectively captures this distinction because it emphasizes the motive clause's potential to inflame racialized law enforcement even while facially neutral. As Chon and Arzt state:
Currently, the law's simultaneous presence and absence in the domain of religion contribute to the social construction of an inferior racial category, resulting in discrimination proscribed by public rhetoric but tolerated and even extended through key omissions in the structures of legal doctrine and theory. 91 Their comment brings home the importance of scrutinizing official texts, like the Khawaja appeal judgments, to identify ways that the decisions might authorize racial hatred by providing rationalizations for profiling, however unwittingly. As Chon and Artzt explain, tacit approval for religious and racial discrimination may remain hidden in legal discourse unless subject to socio-legal scrutiny. Statements by the Supreme Court of Canada that the motive clause is -clearly drafted in a manner respectful of diversity‖ and that it -raises no concerns with respect to improper stereotyping‖ exemplify Chon and Artz's concerns by defending a law that was vigorously critiqued for its human rights implications.
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V. LIMITATIONS
The motive clause passages in Khawaja (2010) and Khawaja (2012) were closely read and considered. From this qualitative content review, I isolate ways the appeal judgments bolster suspicion and stigma by applying the legal tests in ways that undermine substantive equality. I begin by identifying and discussing problems that are unique to the Court of Appeal decision. I discuss the Ontario appellate court's problematic statement that affected members of the Muslim 
A. Findings from the Ontario Court of Appeal: The Assertion that the Muslim Community Was Unaware of the Law
The belief that Canadian Muslims have weak citizenship claims appears to have been a factor in the Ontario Court of Appeal judgment. In dismissing the s. 2 Charter claims, the lower appeal court asserted that the -chilling effect‖ could not be substantiated because the motive clause was -in all probability...unknown to the vast majority of persons who [were] said to be ‗chilled' by its existence.‖ 93 Yet, in Canada citizens and residents are presumed to know the law. 94 This statement also suggests that Canadian Muslims are not part of national conversations regarding anti-terrorism law and the motive clause. It ignores the fact that Muslim organizations and leaders are active in discussions on anti-terrorism policies, and are at least generally aware of the main issues. 95 Gova and Kurd found their research participants were versed in anti-terrorism policies and security practices.
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The Court of Appeal's claim that Muslims are largely unaware of the law implies that they are isolated from the mainstream and do not engage in ordinary pursuits, 93 In support of this conclusion, the Ontario Court of Appeal cited Reference re Marine Transportation Security Regulations, 2009 FCA 234 (CanLII). The court determined that those persons who were informed about the motive clause were also likely to be aware of s. 83.01(1.1) which permits -all forms of expression of political, religious or ideological belief unless these expressions coincide with forms of behaviour that constitute ‗terrorist activity.'‖ Khawaja (2010), supra note 1 at para 127.
94
Nancy S Kastner, "Mistake of Law and the Defence of Officially Induced Error‖ (1985-1986) 28 Crim LQ 308. 95 Bahdi, supra note 3 at 299 describes Faisal Joseph's efforts to provide advice on the antiterrorism law. Joseph missed a flight he was scheduled to take to meet with the Minister of Justice to discuss how Canada's anti-terrorism legislation promoted racial profiling and discrimination. He was pulled aside for a heightened security check resulting in delay. 97 The thin frameworks of belonging mean they may not be imagined as genuine members of the broader society. 98 The underlying concern is that Muslims are not in Canada with bona fide claims to citizenship. Rather, they are cast as -sleeper terrorists‖ who must be dealt with accordingly, through regular scrutiny and even containment. 103 negative words were given by thirty per cent of research participants. The word -fanatic‖ was most common, with -radical‖ and -terror‖ mentioned with similar frequency.
104 Notably, fifty eight per cent of respondents acknowledged knowing little or nothing about Islam.
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These attitudes are part of a larger reconfiguration of Canadian identity post-9/11. According to Sedef Arat-Koc, the social policy focus shifted emphasis from multiculturalism to the normalization of heightened suspicion after 9/11. In her view:
Racially coded, this reconfiguration of Canadian identity has made national belonging and the citizenship of racialized groups 97 Bahdi, supra note 3 at 315. press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=358>, quoted in Chopra, ibid at 2. 105 Ibid at 2. more precarious than it was under the ambiguous and contradictory terms of liberal multiculturalism.
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Arat-Koc's findings bring the debate to a conceptual, philosophical level that reveals the racialized bias that underpins the appellate court's assertion that Muslims were largely uninformed about the federal law. The appellate court's statement is more than a neutral finding of fact. Instead, it positions Muslims as foreign and Other, justifying suspicion and stigma.
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B. The Acceptance of the Trope of the Radical Muslim Terrorist
Passages from the Khawaja decisions illustrate how persons charged with terrorist offences are cast as the -Other‖. Research by Cyra Akila Choudhury verifies that Muslims are viewed as foreign and marginal. He found that Muslims are placed in three categories by the media: the -Terrorist‖, who subscribes to violence; the -Believer‖, who is a Muslim fundamentalist; and the -Moderate‖, who has assimilated to the norms of Western societies. 108 While this typology collapses a diverse group of people into simplistic classifications, it is not a recent development. Illeana Porras raised concerns about anti-terrorism language and rhetoric in a powerful 1994 article in which she reviewed how terrorism was constructed, reinforced and distributed through the media.
109 Porras' comments on the return of the terrorist within the political and social imagination are relevant in the post 9/11 climate, where Canadians are preoccupied with terrorism. Porras concluded:
The moslem moorish turkish invader of Europe dark mysterious turban wearing merciless scimitar wielding head cutting harem keeping mosque going minaret prayer chanting magician christian hating jerusalem prophanator holy war maker of the past has made a remarkable comeback.
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Porras described the anti-terrorism literature she reviewed as vitriolic. In comparison, the observations in Khawaja (2010) and (2012) are measured and deliberate, lacking the hateful tone found in the literature Porras reviewed. The Supreme Court acknowledged, for example, that rehabilitation should be considered as a sentencing factor in terrorist related cases, even though the Court of Appeal implied otherwise.
111 While the judgments' overall tone is considered, certain passages hint at the inflamed, anti-Muslim typecasting that alarmed Porras 
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The Supreme Court was disinterested in this evidence and preferred the appellate court's conclusions on Khawaja's culpability. 131 In dismissing this evidence, the court undermined Khawaja's lived experience as credible testimony.
The language in Khawaja (2010) particularly suggests an exaggerated antiterrorist discourse is in play. Here, I apply Tator and Henry's critical discourse analysis methodology to the appellate decision to reveal how -racism manifests itself in the everyday discourses of the White elite.‖ 132 Tator and Henry argue that prominent texts, ranging from news reports, government studies, and by inference, court decisions, are appropriately viewed as -ideological expression[s] of Whiteness‖ 133 that reinforce racially based divisions. According to their research, the profiling of Black Canadians is justified by institutional texts that strengthen the dominant society's ideology and power. When scrutinized through a critical discourse lens, the appellate court's language and rhetoric over-emphasized the -terrorist‖ threat posed by Khawaja specifically, and by Muslims generally.
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In its deliberations on the motive clause, the Court of Appeal attributed the -chilling effect‖ to several causes. One was the -reality of the world we live in,‖ 124 Ibid at para 33 quotes from an email from Mr. Khawaja: -So sometimes things that seem wrong from face-value due to our lack of info or understanding, such as certain operations that Muj carry out against the kuffar [or non-believers], may in fact be very noble deeds with great long-term benefits for the Muslim Ummah.‖ For further discussion of the depictions of Khawaja in the press see Nicholson, supra note 63. 125 Khawaja (2012), supra note 2 at para 87. 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid at para 90. 128 Ibid at para 91. 129 Ibid at para 89. 130 -Appellant's Factum, supra note 52 at para 65. where terrorism and the fear it generates are -facts of life.‖ 135 The court suggested that the -suspicion based on ignorance and stereotyping‖ in Canadian society was a product of fear rather than the operation of the law. The fact that Muslim Canadians were mistrusted resulted from their over-involvement in global terrorism. Without citing any -hard‖ evidence, as it had demanded from the defence on links between a negative climate and the motive clause, the Court of Appeal attributed a significant portion of terrorist activities to Muslim radicals while acknowledging that terrorist behaviour was not limited to any religious minority. It stated that -[m]any, but by no means all, of the major terrorist attacks in the last 10 years have been perpetrated by radical Islamic groups.‖ 136 A 2011 study, however, found that the claim that terrorists are disproportionately Muslim was not empirically supportable. In The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists, Charles Kurzman, a professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, described the risk of Islamic terrorism as a narrow and tightly confined threat. 137 Muslims who supported terrorism were found to be marginalized and at the fringes of their own communities without widespread support. 138 Kurzman's findings that low numbers of Muslims are actually involved with terrorism suggest the appellate court's reasoning -that negative images and fear of Muslims were based in the reality of their over-involvement in terrorism -was not informed by a comprehensive survey of the research.
139
The Ontario Court of Appeal also reduces the causes of terrorist actions to -a potent mix of religious and political fanaticism.‖ 140 In making this assertion, the court simplified the complexity of terrorist behaviour by suggesting that, unlike secular bodies, Muslims as a religious group are prone to violence. Alternatively, the United Nations attributes global terrorism to a range of social environmental factors, including -poverty, underdevelopment, inequality, disease, and other economic and social problems. Oxford University Press, 2011) at 23 [Kurzman]: -As the trauma of 9/11 recedes, Americans will come to realize that -for all its faults and dangers -the world today is safer than it has ever been.‖ He further states: -Terrorism kills fewer people now than it did in the 1980s.‖ 138 Ibid at 11: -Global Islamist terrorists have managed to recruit fewer than 1in 15,000. Muslims over the past quarter century and fewer than 1 in 100,000 Muslims since 9/11.‖ An unnamed security official interviewed in regard to Momin Khawaja stated: -There are probably tens of thousands of people in Canada who have radical views on how the world should be run... but the number of people who would be willing to go the extra step and carry out a violent act is low.‖ He further stated that while -there are young radicalized Muslims in Canada who might be prepared to commit violence‖, their numbers are few He estimated that the figures were ‗perhaps in the low hundreds.' Chris Cobb, -Momin Khawaja: The road from fun-loving teen to terror suspect‖, The Ottawa Citizen (23 June 2008) online: <http://www2.canada.com/ottawacitizen/features/khawajatrial/story.html?id=61d14370-d12d-47f0-8e69-23722cc5f663>. 139 Kurzman, ibid. 140 Ibid. It is hardly surprising that, in the public mind, terrorism is associated with the religious and political views of radical Islamists. Nor is it surprising that some members of the public extend that association to all who fit within a very broad racial and cultural stereotype of a radical Islamist.
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By using such language, the court amplifies and reproduces the view that a sizeable portion of terrorists are Muslim, thereby linking a form of criminal activity to a cultural and religious minority. 144 This connection implicitly condones policing practices that contain and control a Muslim population that is considered flat, without diversity and variation. 145 If this is the case, an entire community is identified for regulation and control as a uniform criminal threat. However unintentionally, the appellate court accepted the menacing figure of the -Muslim monster-terrorist‖, to use Neel Ahuja's terminology, as the protagonist of international terrorism, leading to a sweeping denigration of a community. 147 Saul stated there was a need for -some hard evidence‖ to verify that the risks would -actually materialize.‖ 148 His perspective was persuasive in the Khawaja appeal cases. In its reasons upholding the constitutionality of the motive clause, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that Mr. Khawaja had presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate links between the motive clause, the -chilling effect‖ and racially motivated policing.
According to the Court of Appeal, the Superior Court incorrectly focused on non-terrorist suspects rather than those accused of terrorist crimes. Using a nondirectly affected group as the unit of analysis lacked precedent given that a law's broader impacts are typically considered under the s. 1 analysis. 149 Following this error, the appellate court criticized the absence of any evidence establishing a -chilling effect‖ before the Superior Court. The lower court implied that judicial notice could be taken that the provision had deleterious consequences for Muslim minorities. The appellate court rejected Rutherford J.'s approach, noting the precedents were clear on when notice could be taken. 150 At paragraph 119 of its decision, the Court of Appeal stated:
The problem with the trial judge's view of the indirect effect of the impugned definition is that it is founded entirely on speculation, both as to the existence of the ‗chilling effect' and the cause or source of that ‗chilling effect', if indeed one exists. The trial judge simply declared that the ‗chilling effect' on the rights of certain segments of our society to freely express themselves was ‗the inevitable impact ' , supra note 1 at para 118. According to the appellate court:
A finding of unconstitutionality based on a collateral effect on persons whose conduct is not within the terms of the statute is, to our knowledge, unique to this case. The impact of legislation on persons who are not directly ‗caught' by the terms of the legislation is normally addressed in the context of the proportionality analysis required by s. 1 of the Charter. 150 Ibid at para 123. The court stated:
The trial judge did not suggest that he was taking judicial notice of the ‗chilling effect' of the motive clause, although that is what he did. Accepting that the scope of judicial notice is broader in respect of non-adjudicative social facts, such as the potential ‗chilling effect' of legislation, judicial notice still requires that the fact of which judicial notice is taken be one that is not open to reasonable dispute after due inquiry. 151 Ibid at para 119. The appellate court noted: -In doing so, he relied on similar declarations made by academic commentators.‖ See Khawaja (2006) , supra note 11 at paras 55-58. 152 , supra note 2 at para 80.
Both levels of appeal court agreed that the -chilling effect‖ needed to be established empirically. 153 The Court of Appeal found that even anecdotal evidence was absent, suggesting that qualitative studies might have been influential if the necessary link was established. 154 The appellate court promoted a very exacting test where a negative climate was clearly linked to the operation of the motive itself, rather than the set of racialized policies, practices, and attitudes towards Arabs and Muslims that socio-legal studies link to the War Against Terrorism. 155 The Attorney General of Canada stressed this point before the Supreme Court of Canada, stating in its factum:
The [Ontario Court of Appeal] was correct: Charter decisions cannot be made in a factual vacuum and there is no evidence that the motive requirement ‗chills' freedom of expression.
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In contrast to the findings by both appellate courts, I press for greater weight for socio-legal scholarship. At the Supreme Court of Canada hearing, Khawaja's counsel maintained that the -chilling effect‖ could be inferred -on the basis of logic, common sense and the academic literature,‖ in keeping with the trial judge's approach. 157 As Pue and Russo have observed, Rutherford J.'s methodology was sound because he -approached the matter carefully and fully, engaging in a thorough survey of both scholarly literature and comparative anti-terrorism legislation.‖ 158 The trial judge's -frame of reference‖ was, appropriately, the -real world of police work, intelligence gathering, imperfect information, and human interactions.‖ 159 I argue that the Supreme Court was incorrect in ruling that no persuasive evidence was before the court establishing a causal relationship between the motive clause and the -chilling effect.‖ 160 It incorrectly dismissed Khawaja's claim that the motive clause bolsters improper police conduct in a hostile climate where inequities are more pronounced. Prior case law from the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the use of social fact evidence or social science research to create -a frame of reference or background context for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a particular case.‖ 161 The court defined social facts as ones that are general in nature and that -help to explain aspects of the evidence.‖
162
In R. v. Spence (2005) , the Supreme Court of Canada ruled against an accused who argued that anti-black bias could taint the jury's views of a crime committed against an 153 Ibid. 154 , supra note 1 at para 122. The court stated -...one would have thought that the East Indian male due to interracial conflict, leading to his request to challenge potential jurors for cause. 163 Spence's argument that the court could take judicial notice of the bias was rejected as an unwarranted extension of the law. 164 While Spence's reasoning failed, the Supreme Court listed cases where social science evidence was sufficient to justify judicial notice of social phenomena. 165 These included R. v. Lavallee where the -battered wife syndrome‖ helped explain the commission of a homicide towards an abusive partner. 166 The consequences of the -feminization of poverty‖ were recognized in Moge v. Moge. 167 The -systemic or background factors that have contributed to the challenges faced by Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system and society at large were acknowledged in R. v. Wells 168 and in R. v. Gladue. 169 These decisions are precedents for Rutherford J.'s acceptance of academic studies as sufficient evidence to substantiate the -chilling effect‖ from the operation of the motive clause in a racially charged climate. In contrast, the Supreme Court held that Khawaja was not an appropriate case for the recognition of social facts based on academic findings. Given the extensive social science research and anecdotal accounts available on racialized profiling, this conclusion is disappointing.
Importantly, there is a well-established, if not incontrovertible, literature on the existence and operation of racial profiling. 170 The positivistic, actuarial approach endorsed by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada that emphasizes quantitative findings is incompatible with racial profiling. Refuting the insistence on -hard‖ proof, Tator and Henry accept as presumptive or -a priori‖ that -police (and other institutions such as the courts, the schools, the media, and social services) do practise differential behaviour towards…people of colour … ‖ 171 Indeed, the Ontario appellate court acknowledged at paragraph 122 that proof is not required in every instance. While the onus of establishing a s. 2 breach rests with the applicant, evidence is " [u] sually, although not always" required to meet that onus. 172 The Supreme Court of Canada recognized that a -chilling effect‖ could be inferred from -known facts and experience‖ in some instances even while refusing to reach this conclusion in . 173 The highest court offered a glimmer of hope to future applicants by rejecting a position the Court of Appeal seemed to adopt -that a claimant under s. 2 of the Charter must always call evidence of a chilling effect.‖ 174 The appellate courts' insistence on precise evidence associated with positivistic methodologies undermines findings based on lived experience. Because racially based violence and profiling often operate in the shadows, these practices can be hard to document and difficult for courts to assess. 175 Pue asserts that -only the tiniest sliver of state action is ever subjected to judicial review.‖ 176 As a result, comments by the courts on phenomena like discriminatory policing have -a somewhat abstract, other-worldly character, grotesquely distanced from the quotidian routine in which subjects encounter state authority.‖ 177 There is substantial research, some of it peer-reviewed, as well as anecdotal evidence that points to connections between laws and police behaviour. 178 For example, a study by Deborah Wilkins Newman and Nikki-Qui D Brown demonstrates a link between American anti-terrorism law and racialized policing. 179 Newman and
Brown concluded that the USA Patriot Act 180 was a factor in the suspicion that law enforcement officials directed towards Middle Eastern males. While no studies have replicated these conclusions specifically with respect to the motive clause, a number of studies validate an escalation in violence against Muslims since 9/11. 181 The emphasis on the violence of terrorists embedded within both appellate decision masks the significant threats to Muslim bodies shown by the global statistics on war casualties 182 and the Canadian figures on hate crime, cited earlier. 183 while it recognized that evidence of a chilling effect was not always necessary under s. 2 of the Charter.
189
In 2003, Reem Bahdi reinforced the absence of an authentic -exit‖ or escape from complex justice-related problems with international ramifications when simplistic solutions, including profiling, are endorsed and utilized. 190 Bahdi highlights our collective willingness to identify others as the perpetrators of human rights violations. I suggest that we need to face our own complicity through the quiet acceptance of discriminatory practices. The Khawaja appellate judgments are significant, yet troubling, retreats from equality-oriented values. By identifying and challenging the appellate courts' conclusions on the motive clause, I hope to encourage concerted effort to address the impact of post-9/11 policies on the marginalized communities most affected by them. 191 189 , supra note 2 at para 79. 190 Bahdi, supra note 3 at 316. 191 Khalema & Wannas-Jones, supra note 181 at 25 outline objectives for their research that should guide overall policy changes. They state -Thus, the ultimate goal of the study was to provide a basis for engagement in action that challenges racism and bias, empowers those affected, and ultimately transforms their lives and those around them.‖
